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This article examines the common law doctrine of
contracts involving persons deemed to be adjudicated and nonadjudicated mentally incompetent. It reviews the current case
law in New York as it relates to contracts of persons deemed to
be "incapacitated" pursuant to Article 81 of the Mental
Hygiene Law. The article attempts to outline the similarities
and differences between general contract law and the Mental
Hygiene Law as they relate to contracts ofthe "incompetent
person" and the "incapacitated person." The burden of proof
required to establish "incapacity" pursuant to the Mental
Hygiene Law and mental capacity required to enter into a
contract is also discussed.
I.

TRADITIONAL CONTRACT LAW

Early New York Court of Appeals cases clearly
established the contract rules regarding adjudicated and nonadjudicated incompetents. A contract made with a person duly
adjudged incompetent and for whom a committee has been
appointed is void 1 and a contract of a non-adjudicated
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incompetent is voidable? In an early decision, the New York
Court of Appeals held in Blinn v. Schwartz, that a deed of a
person actually insane, but never so adjudged, is not void, in
the sense of being a nullity. It is voidable at his election upon
recovering his reason, and may then be ratified or avoided at
his pleasure. The deed has force and effect until the option to
declare it void is exercised. 3 This privilege is denied to the
party with whom the mental incompetent contracted.4

evidence that, even though understanding was complete, the
nature of a particular mental disease was such that the capacity
of a contracting party to control his acts was eliminated and he
was induced to enter the contract. This test recognizes the
ability of mental disease such as manic depressive psychosis to
control a person's actions despite the individual having an
understanding of the transaction. In Ortelere v. Teachers
8
Retirement Bd., the New York Court of Appeals, held that a
modern understanding of mental illness, suggests that
incapacity to contract or exercise contractual rights may exist,
because of volitional and affective impediments or disruptions
in the personality, despite the intellectual or cognitive ability to
understand. 9 Grace Ortelere, an elementary school teacher
since 1924, suffered a "nervous breakdown" in March, 1964
and went on a leave of absence which expired on February 5,
1965. She was then 60 years old. On July 1, 1964, she came
under the care of Dr. D'Angelo, a psychiatrist who diagnosed
her breakdown as involutional psychosis, melancholia type.
Dr. D'Angelo prescribed six weeks of tranquilizers and shock
therapy. Dr. D'Angelo continued to see her monthly until
March, 1965. On March 28, 1965, she was hospitalized after
collapsing at home from an aneurysm and died ten days later.

There are different tests to determine if the requisite
mental capacity to contract existed.
Test I
In New York State, the requisite mental capacity to
enter a contract has been measured by what is largely a
cognitive test. 5 This test examines whether the contracting
party was capable of understanding and appreciating the nature
and consequences of the particular transaction. The level of
"insanity" to avoid the contract must be an absolute incapacity
to understand the effect of the act. Therefore, mere weakness
of mind, or partial insanity or monomania, unconnected with
the subject matter of the contract, is not sufficient. A moderate
degree of incapacity may be sufficient where the transaction is
accompanied by fraud, imposition or duress. 6 Persons
suffering from a disease such as Alzheimer's are not presumed
incompetent. 7

Test 2
The second test is the motivational test. This test does
not examine whether or not the contractual party understood
the transaction. It focuses on whether the act of entering into
the agreement was the result of mental illness. The
motivational test is subjective. It applies when there is

As a teacher she had been a member of the Teachers'
Retirement System of the City ofNew York. This entitled her
to certain annuity and pension rights, pre-retirement death
benefits, and allowed her to exercise various options
concerning the payment of her retirement allowance. On June
28, 1958, she had executed a 'Selection of Benefits under
Option One' naming her husband as beneficiary of the
unexhausted reserve. Under this option, upon retirement her
allowance would be lower retirement allowances, but if she
died before receipt of her full reserve, the balance would be
payable to her husband. On June 16, 1960, she designated her
husband as beneficiary of her service death benefits in the
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event she died prior to retirement. On February 11, 1965,
when her leave of absence had just expired and while she was
still being treated, she executed a retirement application,
selecting the maximum retirement allowance payable during
her lifetime with nothing payable on or after death. Three days
earlier she had written the Teacher' s Retirement Board of the
City of New York, stating that she intended to retire on
February 12 or 15 or as soon as she received "the information I
need in order to decide whether to take an option or maximum
allowance." She asked eight specific questions, which
demonstrated an understanding of the retirement system
concerning the various alternatives available. An extremely
detailed reply was sent, by letter of February 15, 1965,
although by that date it was technically impossible for her to
change her selection of how retirement benefits would be paid.
The board's chief clerk, before whom Mrs. Ortelere executed
the application, testified that the questions were answered
verbally on February 11, 1965. Her retirement reserve totaled
$62,165. Following her leave of absence, Mrs. Ortelere
became very depressed and was unable to care for herself. Her
husband brought an action to set aside his wife's retirement
application by reason of her mental incompetency. The
Supreme Court entered judgment declaring that the retirement
application of decedent was null and void. Her husband
recovered judgment for full amount of the reserve credited to
her at the time of her death and the Retirement Board appealed.
The Supreme Court, Appellate Division reversed and dismissed
the complaint and the husband appealed. The New York Court
of Appeals held that the Retirement Board of the Teacher's
Retirement System of the City ofNew York was, or should
have been, fully aware ofMrs. Ortelere's condition. They, or
the Board of Education, knew of her leave of absence for
medical reasons and her use of staff psychiatrists. 'The
avoidance of duties under an agreement entered into by those
who have done so by reason of mental illness, but who have

understanding, depends on balancing competing policy
considerations. There must be stability in contractual relations
and protection of the expectations of parties who bargain in
good faith. On the other hand, it is also desirable to protect
persons who may understand the nature of the transaction but
10
who, due to mental illness, cannot control their conduct."
Incompetency to contract may exist, despite the presence of
cognition, when a contract is made under the compulsion of
11
manic depressive psychosis.
The law presumes the competence of a contractual
party. In the case of an adjudicated incompetent, all that is
necessary is the production of a certified copy of the judgment
declaring the person to be "incompetent." In the case of a nonadjudicated incompetent, the burden of proving one's
incompetence is on the party alleging it. 12 The later must
demonstrate that, because of the affliction, the person was
13
incompetent at the time of the transaction. In Ortelere, the
court held that a showing of medically classified psychosis is
required otherwise few contracts would be invulnerable to a
psychological attack. 14 According to the court, it was apparent
the plaintiff's evidence was sufficient to sustain a finding that,
when she acted on February 11 , she did so as a result of serious
15
mental illness, namely, psychosis. Grace Ortelere's
psychiatrist testified that, as an involutional melancholiac in
depression, she was incapable of making a voluntary "rational"
decision. 16 Lay witnesses cannot properly give an opinion as
to party's mental capacity as to rationality or irrationality, even
when such opinion might be based upon specific acts and
17
conversations, or personal observations. The lay witness
could state the acts and conversations of which he had personal
knowledge, and then be permitted to say whether, in his
judgment, such acts and conversations were rational or
18
irrational.
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II.

THE MENTAL HYGIENE LAW

Article 81 of the Mental Hygiene Law was enacted in
1992 after an extensive study of the statutes governing
fiduciary appointments for incapacitated persons by the New
York State Law Revision Commission. Although its initial
purpose was to revise former Article 77 (conservatorship) and
former Article 78 (committeeship) of the Mental Hygiene Law,
the Commission ultimately found it necessary to establish a
new statutory system to provide for the needs of disabled
persons. The Commission concluded that former Articles 77
and 78 of the Mental Hygiene Law failed to provide relief
sufficient to meet the needs of persons who, while neither
incompetent nor substantially impaired are functionally limited
19
in providing for the activities of daily. Rather than amending
the existing committeeship and conservatorship statutes, the
Commission proposed the adoption of a new statutory system
of guardianship to be set forth in Article 81 of the Mental
Hygiene Law. In 1992, the Legislature complied by repealing
former Articles 77 and 78 and enacting the proposed
guardianship statute as Article 81 of the Mental Hygiene Law.
The primary objective of Article 81 is to provide a system of
fiduciary appointments for persons who are unable to provide
20
for the activities of daily living. In a proceeding brought
pursuant to Article 81, however, the court is not called upon to
21
determine whether an individual is competent or incompetent.
A finding of incapacity by the court conducting the hearing
22
does not establish that a person is incompetent. Article 81
specifically provides that the appointment of a guardian shall
not be conclusive evidence that the person lacks capacity for
any other purpose, including the capacity to dispose of property
by will except those powers and rights which the guardian is
23
granted.
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The protocol for the proceedings are defined by the
statute. Any party has the right to (1) present evidence;
(2) call witnesses, including expert witnesses; (3) cross
examine witnesses, including witnesses called by the court;
(4) be represented by counsel of his or her choice. The hearing
must be conducted in the presence of the person alleged to be
incapacitated, either at the courthouse or where the person
resides, to permit the court to obtain its own impression of the
person's capacity. If the person alleged to be incapacitated
physically cannot come or be brought to the courthouse, the
hearing must be conducted where the person resides unless:
(1) the person is not present in the state; or (2) all the
information before the court clearly establishes that (i) the
person alleged to be incapacitated is completely unable to
participate in the hearing or (ii) no meaningful participation
will result from the person's presence at the hearing. 2
24

Article 81 defines the required burden and quantum of
26
proof necessary in a guardianship proceeding. The standard
of proof must demonstrate that a person is incapacitated based
upon clear and convincing evidence. 27 The statute permits a
28
court for "good cause shown" to waive the rules of evidence.
It permits hearsay evidence to be admitted into the proceedings
through the testimony of a court evaluator9 and allows a court
evaluator to testify about his report which usually contains
hearsay evidence if the court deems such information to be
31
reliable.30 The law requires a hearing with witnesses. There
is no requirement expert witnesses, such as a psychiatrist,
psychologist be called. The court can take testimony from a
nurse or social worker. In some cases, the court has ruled that
testimony of lay witnesses is suffice for a finding of a person
32
being " incapacitated. "
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The finding of a "substantial impairment" under former
Article 77 concerning conservatorships did not establish
incompetence allowing a court to declare a contract "void." In
an Article 77 proceeding, a psychiatrist was required to testify
concerning the ability or inability of the alleged conservatee to
manage business matters only. The determination that a person
was in need of a "committee" under former article 78
concerning committteeships did establish imcompetence
allowing a court to declare a contract "void." In an Article 78
proceeding, a psychiatrist was required to testify concerning
the ability or inability of the alleged incompetent to manage
both person and property. The finding of "incapacity" pursuant
to article 81 gives the court the power to declare contracts of
the "incapacitated" to be void. The Article 81 court is given
the power, if it determines that the person is incapacitated and
appoints a guardian: to modify, amend, or revoke any
previously executed appointment, power, or delegation or any
contract, conveyance, or disposition during lifetime or to take
effect upon death, made by the incapacitated person prior to the
appointment of the guardian. 33 Article 81 courts have held that
(1) a marriage contract constitutes a contract within the
meaning of the Mental Hygiene Law. 34 As such, it is subject to
revocation by the court on the ground that a party thereto for
whom a guardian has been appointed was "incapacitated" at
the time it was contracted rendering such party incapable of
consenting thereto by reason of want of understanding. 35
Health care proxies, durable powers of attorney, amended and
restated certificates of trusts, and Last Will and Testaments
have also been invalidated. 36 The Appellate Division in
affirming the Surrogate Court held that mental incapacity
invalidated an individual's durable powers of attorney, health
care proxy, and amended and restated certificate of trust,
executed prior to appointment of guardian upon a showing of
clear and convincing evidence the incapacitated person
executed the documents at a time when she was

incapacitated. 37 Moreover, in modifying the Surrogate's
decision, the Appellate Division stated the Last Will and
Testament that was signed and witnessed at approximately the
same time should have also been declared void. 38
CONCLUSION
It is the view of the author that the repealed Articles 77 and
78 worked well. The standard for a conservatorship
proceeding pursuant to Article 77 of the Mental Hygiene Law
required an evaluation and testimony from a psychiatrist that
the alleged conservatee was unable to manage his business
affairs. The standard for a committeeship proceeding pursuant
to Article 78 of the Mental Hygiene Law required an
evaluation and testimony from a psychiatrist that the alleged
incompetent could not manage both his financial affairs and
person necessitating the appointment of a committee. The
burden of proof was similar to that required in a breach of
contract action seeking to have a contract rescinded on the
basis of mental incompetence. In such proceedings there is a
requirement that a psychiatrist testify.

Article 81 does not require testimony from a psychiatrist to
have a person declared "incapacitated." Moreover, in a special
proceeding, contracts can be declared voidable without the
need for an actual finding of a mental illness. The burden of
proof in an Article 81 proceeding have been relaxed. A
contract can easily be avoided by filing an Order to Show
Cause, attending a hearing within thirty days and having a
nurse, social worker, psychologist, or doctor testify about
behavior of the alleged incapacitated person. This type of
testimonial evidence is dramatically different than that required
previously pursuant to the repealed Articles 77 and 78
respectively and in an action in Supreme Court to have a
contract avoided due to mental incapacity.

2007 I An Effect of the Revision I 100

101 I Vol. 17 I North East Journal of Legal Studies

Endnotes
1Blinn

v. Schwarz, 177 N.Y. 252,262 (1904); Matter ofDeimer, 85
N.Y.S.2d 506, 509 (4th Dep' t 1948).
2Matter of Gebauer,

361 N.Y.S.2d 539, 544 (Surrogate Court, Cattaraugus
County 1974), affd, 378 N.Y.S.2d 653 (4th Dep't 1976).
3
4

Blinn, 177 N.Y. at 263.

ld., at 262.

5

See Aldrich v. Bailey, 132 N.Y. 85 (1892).

6

Blinn, 177 N.Y. at 262.

7

Feiden v. Feiden, 542 N.Y.S.2d 860, 862 (3d Dep't 1989).

8

25 N.Y. 2d 196 (1969).

90rte1ere

v. Teachers' Retirement Bd., 25 N.Y. 2d 196, 199 (1969).

10

/d., 25 N.Y. 2d at 205.

11

Fingerhut v. Kralyn Industries, Inc., 337 N.Y.S.2d 394, 399 (Supreme
Court, New York County 1971 ).
12Feiden,
13

542 N.Y.S.2d at 862; Matter of Gebauer, 361 N.Y.S.2d at 544.

Feiden, 542 N.Y.S.2d at 862.

14

0rtelere, 25 N.Y. 2d at 206.

19
See, Recommendation of the Law Revision Commission to the 1992
Legislature; McKinney's 1993 Session Laws ofN.Y., p. 2025.
20

N.Y. Mental Hyg. Law§ 8l.Ol(McKinney 2007).
Legislative findings and purpose.
The legislature hereby finds that the needs of persons with incapacities are
as diverse and complex as they are unique to the individual. The current
system of conservatorship and committee does not provide the necessary
flexibility to meet these needs. Conservatorship which traditionally
compromises a person's rights only with respect to property frequently is
insufficient to provide necessary relief. On the other hand, a committee,
with its judicial finding of incompetence and the accompanying stigma and
loss of civil rights, traditionally involves a deprivation that is often
excessive and unnecessary. Moreover, certain persons require some form of
assistance in meeting their personal and property management needs but do
not require either of these drastic remedies. The legislature finds that it is
desirable for and beneficial to persons with incapacities to make available to
them the least restrictive fonn of intervention which assists them in meeting
their needs but, at the same time, pennits them to exercise the independence
and self-detennination of which they are capable. The legislature declares
that it is the purpose of this act to promote the public welfare by
establishing a guardianship system which is appropriate to satisfy either
personal or property management needs of an incapacitated person in a
manner tailored to the individual needs of that person, which takes in
account the personal wishes, preferences and desires of the person, and
which atTords the person the greatest amount of independence and selfdetermination and participation in all the decisions affecting such person's
life.
21

N.Y. Mental Hyg. Law§ 8l.Ol(McKinney 2007).

22

N.Y. Mental Hyg. Law§ 81.29(b)(McKinney 2007).

23

17

Paine v. Aldrich, 133 N.Y. 544,547 (1892).

18

Jd.

N.Y. Mental Hyg. Law§ 81.29 (McKinney 2007). Effect of the
appointment on the incapacitated person
(a) An incapacitated person for whom a guardian has been appointed
retains all powers and rights except those powers and rights which the
guardian is granted.
(b) Subject to subdivision (a) of this section, the appointment of a guardian
shall not be conclusive evidence that the person lacks capacity tor any other

2007 I An Effect of the Revision I 102

103 I Vol. 17 I North EastJoumal of Legal Studies

purpose, including the capacity to dispose of property by will.
(c) The title to all property of the incapacitated person shall be in such
person and not in t11e guardian. The property shall be subject to the
possession of the guardian and to the control of ilie court for the purposes of
administration, sale or other disposition only to the extent directed by the
court order appointing the guardian.
(d) If the court determines that the person is incapacitated and appoints a
guardian, the court may modify, amend, or revoke any previously executed
appointment, power, or delegation under section 5-150 l, [fig 1] 5-1505, or
5-1506 of the general obligations law or section two thousand nine hundred
sixty-five of the public health law, or section two thousand nine hundred
eighty-one of the public health law notwithstanding section two thousand
nine hundred ninety-two of the public health law, or any contract,
conveyance, or disposition during lifetime or to take effect upon death,
made by the incapacitated person prior to the appointment of the guardian if
the court finds that the previously executed appointment. power, delegation.
contract, conveyance, or disposition during lifetime or to take effect upon
death, was made while the person was incapacitated or if the court
detennines that there has been a breach of fiduciary duty by the previously
appointed agent. In such event, the court shall require that the agent account
to the guardian.
(e) Nothing in this article shall be construed either to prohibit a court from
granting, or to authorize a court to grant, to any person the power to give
consent for the withholding or withdrawal of life sustaining treatment,
including artificial nutrition and hydration. When used in this article, life
sustaining treatment means medical treatment which is sustaining life
functions and without which, according to reasonable medical judgment,
that patient will die within a relatively short time period.

evaluator testifies and is subject to cross examination; provided, however,
that if the court determines that information contained in ilie report is, in the
particular circumstance of the case, not sufficiently reliable, the court shall
require that the person who provided the information testify and be subject
to cross examination.

24

N.Y. Mental Hyg. Law§ 8l.li(McKinney 2007).

26

N.Y. Mental Hyg. Law§ 81.12(McKinney 2007).

Burden and quantum of proof
(a) A detetmination that a person is incapacitated under the provisions of
this article must be based on clear and convincing evidence. Tbe burden of
proof shall be on the petitioner.
(b) The cou11 may, for good cause shown, waive the rules of evidence. The
report of the court evaluator may be admitted in evidence if the court

27

N.Y. Mental Hyg. Law§ 81.12 (a) (McKinney 2007).

29

N.Y. Mental Hyg. Law§ 81.12 (b) (McKinney 2007).

31

N.Y. Mental Hyg. Law§ 8l.ll(McKinney 2007).

32

This is not the same standard required to declare a contractual party
incapacitated within the meaning general contract law. In Paine v. Aldrich,
supra, the Court of Appeals held in an action to set aside a deed on the
ground that the grantor was at the time of its execution, non compos mentis,
that the opinion of a witness not an expert was inadmissable evidence.
33

N.Y. Mental Hyg. Law §81.29 (d) (McKinney 2007).

34

Matter of Jayne Johnson, 658 N.Y.S.2d 780,785 (Supreme Court, Suffolk
County 1997).

36

Matter of Rita R, 811 N.Y.S.2d 89 (2d Dep't 2006).

